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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
DEAN DILLER: Good evening. My name is Matthew Diller, and I
have the honor of being the Dean of Fordham University School of Law.
I would like to welcome all of you to the seventeenth Annual Sommer
Lecture, which we are very proud to host here at the law school. In a few
minutes, you will be hearing the lecture delivered by Ira Hammerman,
and we are very excited to have you here with us tonight and very
interested in hearing your remarks and your thoughts.
The Sommer Lecture is a great partnership between the firm of
Morgan Lewis—and I am pleased to see so many Morgan Lewis
representatives here with us tonight—and Fordham Law School, and in
particular, with our Corporate Law Center here at Fordham.
That marriage is not an incidental or accidental result; rather, it stems
from the work of the great John Peloso. I want to acknowledge and thank
you, John. John is a graduate of our school from the Class of 1960. He is
a founder of the Corporate Law Center here at Fordham. The Corporate
Law Center is a key part of our business law programs. We are one of the
great business law schools in this country, and that is in good measure
due to the work that we do through the Corporate Center, which is our
major hub of activity around corporate law.
John had the foresight and vision to help us found the Center and
help build it and grow it to where it is now. He has also taught here as a
member of our adjunct faculty, and it is always a pleasure to see you and
to collaborate with you, John.
I am also grateful to Ben Indek, a Partner at Morgan Lewis. Thank
you for your support and your collaboration, both tonight and into the
future in this greater collaboration between our school and your great law
firm.
I want to say a couple of more things about the Corporate Law
Center, and then we can get on with this evening’s main event. I do want
to point out that the Center was established in 2001. There are three areas
that it focuses on: the first is public lectures; to wit, roundtable
discussions, expert panels, conferences, and programs that help educate
those in the legal community, business community, and the public at large
on important issues around corporate governance and corporate law. The
Center is also a platform that showcases and supports the work of our
fabulous faculty—a number of whom are with us tonight—in the field of
corporate law. Corporate law has played a key role in bringing our faculty
together and projecting our research and work out into the world. Third,
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and extremely importantly, the Center is a resource for students here at
Fordham Law School. It connects them to our alumni through the
business law practitioner series and through a variety of other mentoring
programs that bring our students on board and help carry forth our
school’s tradition in corporate law.
Finally, I will mention one more aspect of the Corporate Law Center,
which is a relatively new initiative: our corporate compliance initiative.
We have seen the tremendous growth in compliance as a field. Given our
strength in corporate law and financial regulation, we have established the
first LL.M. degree in corporate compliance, and we have followed that by
establishing what is called an M.S.L. degree, a Master of Studies in Law,
a one-year Master’s degree for non-lawyers who want to specialize, focus,
and build careers in compliance. That program started in January. We
have a number of exciting upcoming events. I will not list them all;
instead I will direct you to the Corporate Law Center website.
I also want to thank Vera Korzun for putting together and
coordinating tonight’s program and for all the work that you do as
Director of the Center. At this point, I want to introduce Ben Indek of
Morgan Lewis, who will then introduce Mr. Hammerman. Thank you all.
MR. INDEK: Good evening, everybody. On behalf of Morgan
Lewis, I wanted to offer my own welcome to the seventeenth Annual A.
A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture.
In 1979, Al Sommer started Morgan Lewis’ securities regulatory
practice. We created this lecture series in his name as a way to honor his
contribution to our firm and his enduring legacy at Morgan Lewis.
The last several years have been very exciting for our firm. We
elected a new chair, Jami McKeon, an incredible leader for Morgan Lewis
and a true visionary in the changing landscape of the law firm world. She
is also fully and enthusiastically committed to our securities regulatory
practice. We welcomed hundreds of lawyers through our combination
with Bingham, including many exceptional attorneys in the securities
enforcement, regulatory, and class action practices. We expanded
internationally as well, merging with one of the most prominent firms in
Singapore and adding a vibrant new office in Shanghai. Tonight we pause
to thank Al and his colleague Lloyd Feller, who is here tonight, for
creating this practice area at Morgan Lewis more than three decades ago.
We stand on their broad shoulders.
A little history: Al was a Morgan Lewis partner from 1979 until 1994
when he became counsel to the firm. He was a tireless public servant, a
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commissioner, Chairman
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of the Public Oversight Board, and a public member of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
As a private practitioner, Al was a trusted adviser, a prolific author,
and an expert on many securities laws, regulations, and rules. We were
lucky to have Al participate in the first two lectures, but unfortunately he
passed away in 2002. We are delighted that his family continues its close
relationship with Morgan Lewis and Fordham and that they are here with
us again this evening. We are also pleased by the continuing support of
the SEC Historical Society and its Executive Director, Carla Rosati, for
their contribution to this lecture series. Al gave the Society his time and
some of his papers to help make the organization a terrific historical
resource.
Turning to tonight’s speaker, Ira Hammerman: Ira is the executive
vice president and general counsel for the Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”). Since 2004, Ira has overseen
SIFMA’s legal advocacy efforts, including its response to the 2008
financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). Prior to joining SIFMA, Ira was a
partner at Clifford Chance, where he represented a wide range of financial
services companies in regulatory and enforcement matters. In short, Ira
has devoted his career to the securities industry and is one of its most
passionate, articulate, and persuasive advocates.
On a more personal note, I like to think that Ira is like the movie star
Kevin Bacon, not because of his dance moves—although I am sure they
are stellar—but because he is an icon of interconnectedness. If you will
indulge me, I would like to explain with a version of the parlor game Six
Degrees of Kevin Bacon, featuring Ira Hammerman in the role of Kevin
Bacon. For those of you not familiar with this pastime, because Bacon has
been in so many different types of Hollywood movies, the premise of the
game is that he can be connected to almost any actor with only a few
steps; the number of steps is a person’s “Bacon number.”
For example, Marlon Brando can be connected to Kevin Bacon in
just two steps: Brando was in the movie The Score with Robert De Niro,
who was in Sleepers with Kevin Bacon; Brando’s Bacon number is two.
But back to Ira: Ira is connected to Morgan Lewis in many ways,
leading to Hammerman number possibilities. Ira’s father, Steve
Hammerman, like Al, was a senior leader at the SEC. Steve served as
Regional Director of the SEC’s New York office. As General Counsel at
Merrill Lynch, Steve was a mentor to several lawyers who later became
partners at Morgan Lewis and was a longtime client of the firm. He

2017]

SEC—DON'T THROW AWAY YOUR SHOT!

309

worked with our own John Peloso and literally dozens of others at the
firm on one of Merrill Lynch’s greatest legal challenges, the bankruptcy
of Orange County, California; Hammerman number—two.
Ira’s brother, Charlie Hammerman, was an associate at Morgan
Lewis before he went on to create and run an outstanding nonprofit
organization called The Disability Opportunity Fund. It helps disabled
people throughout the country in the areas of housing, education, and
training. Our former partner, Anne Flannery, who is also here tonight,
serves on the organization’s board of directors; Hammerman numbers—
two and three.
And, oh yes, there is Ira himself. At Morgan Lewis we have had the
privilege of working closely with Ira on several important initiatives at
SIFMA, including most recently his efforts in the area of fiduciary duty
in the securities industry. We have had a long and productive relationship
with Ira and his team at SIFMA, where a couple of our former colleagues
work. I am not good at math, so I have lost track of the Hammerman
numbers. We look forward to continuing to assist SIFMA in the years
ahead. Now that you know how he is connected, we are thrilled that Ira is
here to speak tonight.
Last year’s speaker, former SEC Commissioner Joe Grundfest, gave
us a speech with the catchy title, “Is the SEC Afraid of Federal Juries and
Judges?” Not to be outdone, tonight Ira gives a nod to pop culture and
Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Broadway hit Hamilton and is set to deliver,
“SEC—Don’t Throw Away Your Shot! A Renewed Call for a Uniform
Fiduciary Standard to Protect Individual Investors.” It promises to be a
blockbuster. Incidentally, if you want to know Miranda’s Bacon number,
see my colleague Ariel Gursky at the reception—she has the answer.
In any event, I know that Al would have loved to be here tonight to
listen to Ira take his shot and, if we are lucky, rap a little chorus. Morgan
Lewis is proud of Al Sommer’s dedication to the securities bar and his
affiliation with our firm, and we are pleased to sponsor this annual lecture
in his honor. I am delighted to turn the podium over to our speaker tonight,
Kevin—I mean Ira—Hammerman. Thank you.
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LECTURE
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: Thank you, Ben, for that kind and funny
introduction. Oh, and by the way, my Bacon number is four. You see, a
few months ago I met Lin-Manuel Miranda—that is one; Lin was in The
Polar Bears, a movie with Armie Hammer—that is two; Hammer was in
The Social Network with Jason Flemyng—that is three; and Jason was in
X-Men: First Class with Kevin Bacon—that is four. Do you follow all
that?
Now that we got that out of the way, let me say I am very honored
and humbled to join you today to deliver the seventeenth Annual A. A.
Sommer, Jr. Lecture. I would like to thank both Morgan Lewis and
Fordham Law for giving me the privilege of addressing you this evening,
and it is extra special to deliver this lecture in front of Starr and some of
Al’s other family members who I had the pleasure to meet a few moments
ago. As we all know, Al Sommer was a leader and pioneer at Morgan
Lewis and began that fine firm’s focus and preeminence in securities law
and in serving the financial services industry.
At the risk of inadvertently leaving anyone out, Morgan Lewis gave
us an earlier generation of leaders that I have come to know and respect,
many of whom are here tonight: folks like Lloyd Feller, John Peloso,
Anne Flannery, Bob Romano, John Hartigan, and Bob Mendelson, among
many others, and today’s leaders, like Ben Indek, Steve Stone, John
Ayanian, Sam Shaulson, Dan Kleinman, and Jon Roelke, who continue
that fine tradition. So thank you, Morgan Lewis, for thinking of me for
this honor.
I would also like to thank Fordham Law School, which has partnered
with Morgan Lewis since 2000, when this important lecture series to
honor Al began.
I am embarrassed to say it has been over thirty-one years since I
visited Fordham. But I have a really, really good excuse. You see, the last
time I was here, July 30 and 31 of 1985, it was a traumatic couple of days.
Yes, I had the lucky privilege of sitting for the New York bar exam right
here at Fordham. Now, I say “lucky” intentionally because that was the
summer that 542 bar exam answer sheets were lost—or is stolen the right
word?—from the Pier 90 location where so many other law school
graduates took the exam that summer, thirty-one years ago. That is a true
story—you can Google it—so, believe me, I love Fordham.
I remember Al Sommer, not from his SEC Commissioner days of
1973 to 1976—I was a Long Island teenager back then, more focused on
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the New York Knicks and their 1973 championship team—but as a young
securities lawyer in the 1980s. I do remember seeing Al on various
securities law panels at conferences, and I would read his writings from
the SEC and from when he was at Morgan Lewis.
Al was a giant among securities lawyers. He was a forward thinker.
In fact, the topic that I have chosen to address this evening is both a tribute
to the forward thinking of Al and an important story that remains very
much in progress. My address is entitled, “SEC—Don’t Throw Away
Your Shot!” It is both a nod to the Broadway smash hit Hamilton—with
which I admit I am a bit obsessed, having seen it now five times—but,
more importantly, it is a renewed call for the SEC to create a uniform
fiduciary standard to protect individual investors.
For those of you who have not yet seen the megahit Hamilton, here’s
a very quick dose of the show honoring our founding father. At any rate,
Al foretold the emergence and expansion of fiduciary duties in the
securities industry, and that was nearly four decades ago in 1978 when he
penned a law review article entitled, “Fiduciary Duties: The Search for
Content.”1 Al began that article with a celebrated quote from Justice
Frankfurter that is as relevant today as it was back then:
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis. It gives
direction to further inquiry: To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed
to discharge those obligations? And what are the consequences of his
deviation from the duty?2

This quote touches on a key concept in today’s fiduciary debate, i.e.,
while there are some fundamental and uniform elements of a fiduciary
duty no matter the context, it is equally true that the manner in which
fiduciary duty is applied in any specific context has elements of
uniqueness that justify separate consideration.
As the General Counsel of SIFMA, I am reminded of this duality
every day. Our members include broker-dealers, banks, and investment
advisers, who recognize that they must act in their clients’ best interests
every day or risk losing those very clients. There is, however, no one-sizefits-all best interest or fiduciary standard that now applies, or that could
ever apply, to the diverse group of business models and functions that our
members follow and perform. And yet, for many years now SIFMA has
1. A. A. Sommer, Jr., Fiduciary Duties–The Search for Content, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
525 (1978).
2. Id. at 525.
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been calling for the SEC to create a uniform fiduciary standard. How can
that be? How did that come to pass? Or, as Lin-Manuel Miranda’s
Hamilton might have phrased it, “How does a broker, dealer, intensely
regulated firm operate so smart yet debate whether he has his client’s best
interest at heart?”3 I know, I know. This white, Jewish, middle-aged
securities lawyer cannot rap at all—I get that.
Our story may not be quite as dramatic as Hamilton’s, but let me
provide a roadmap of three key points that I would like you to take away
from tonight’s lecture. First, let us understand what problem a uniform
fiduciary standard is intended to solve and where things stand today;
second, let us present a solution to the problem of what is the optimal path
forward; third and finally, let us consider how we can remove
impediments to the solution, and here I will touch on why SIFMA is suing
the Department of Labor (“DoL”).
Let us start with the functions that investment advisers and brokers
perform. The core function of an investment adviser is to provide
continuous investment advice to its clients. Some also provide financial
planning services and reports on securities. Brokers, on the other hand,
operate across a far broader spectrum. While many brokers provide
investment advice, others do not. Instead, they focus their business
activities on clearing and settling trades, underwriting securities, or
serving as market makers, for example.
Why is this important? Because the fiduciary debate focuses on the
narrow overlap in services provided by brokers and advisers, i.e., when
they each provide personalized investment advice to their retail clients.
Yet, even when brokers and advisers engage in the same service, there are
important differences between the kinds of investment advice they
provide. Advisers, on the one hand, provide continuous and regular
investment advice to their clients, which entails an ongoing duty to
supervise the account regardless of whether any trading occurs. In
contrast, brokers typically provide episodic investment advice incidental
to a specific transaction and are compensated through commissions or
similar transaction-based arrangements. Most retail investors, including
retirement savers, choose brokerage accounts because they are buy-andhold investors, and brokerage accounts are a more cost-effective choice.

3. Ira D. Hammerman, PowerPoint Presentation for the Seventeenth Annual A. A.
Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law (Nov. 10, 2016) (on file
with the Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law).
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Another key difference is that advisers generally exercise investment
discretion over their client accounts, meaning that the adviser has the
power granted by the client to trade on the client’s behalf without even
speaking with the client. Brokers, on the other hand, provide
nondiscretionary advice. A broker generally cannot trade on his or her
client’s behalf; instead the broker makes an investment recommendation,
and the client is free to take it or leave it. Of course, the biggest difference
between brokers and advisers is the way they are regulated today under
regulatory schemes that trace their roots back to the 1930s and 1940s with
the passage of the federal statutes that govern brokers and advisers.
As this group well knows, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(“Advisers Act”)4 does not expressly mandate a fiduciary duty, but one
was read into the Act by the famous 1963 Supreme Court case in Capital
Gains.5 In that case, the court held that Section 206 of the Advisers Act
imposes fiduciary duties on advisers by operation of law.6 Brokers, on the
other hand, are governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”),7 which recognizes that a broker who provides
personalized investment advice and recommendations to retail clients is
generally not a fiduciary but owes a duty of fair dealing to her clients.
Why then, you may ask, when brokers engage in the same conduct
as advisers—namely, providing investment advice—do they not need to
comply with the presumptively higher fiduciary standard under the
Advisers Act?8 The answer lies in the broker-dealer exclusion. In passing
the Advisers Act, Congress saw fit to provide an exclusion for the
episodic nondiscretionary advice that brokers typically provide to their
clients.9 Thus, under the Advisers Act, brokers are excluded from the
definition of adviser where the advice they provide is solely incidental to
their brokerage business and when they receive no special compensation
for the advice.10 The broker-dealer exclusion reflects Congress’ clear
understanding that there is a natural interrelationship between brokerage
services and providing investment advice and that brokers are already
comprehensively regulated under the Exchange Act.11

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012).
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
Id. at 184-85.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2.
See id.
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk.
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Indeed, over the intervening eight-plus decades, the SEC, the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and the state
securities regulators who oversee brokers have developed a fulsome
regulatory regime based on a broker’s duty of fair dealing, including the
obligation to make suitable recommendations; achieve best execution;
observe high standards of commercial honor, and just and equitable
principles of trade, a concept which itself embodies fiduciary principles.
Brokers, as you know, are also subject to routine and regular exams
from the SEC and FINRA, as opposed to visits by the SEC only once
every eleven years or so for the adviser community. Thus, brokers and
advisers currently operate under high, although somewhat different,
standards of conduct that have developed under separate statutory and
regulatory schemes over many decades.
So far, so good. So, what happened; what changed? The short answer
is that the brokerage community changed. It was once as simple as this:

Figure 112

But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, brokerage firms first started to
introduce new types of full-service accounts—known as fee-based
accounts—that emphasized the importance of the investment advice they
provided and that changed their compensation structure to a fee-based
model, just like investment advisers.
A few years later, in May 1994, then-SEC Chair Arthur Levitt—the
inaugural Sommer lecturer in 2000—formed a broad-based committee led
by Dan Tully, then the Chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch, to
recommend best practices for managing conflicts of interest in the
brokerage industry. In April of 1995, the Tully Report identified as a best
practice that brokers should be compensated using asset-based fees

12.

Hammerman, supra note 3.
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instead of commissions.13 The thinking was that commissions created an
incentive for brokers to trade frequently, or “churn” the account, and that
often the best advice a broker can give a client is to do nothing. The Tully
Report viewed fee-based brokerage as a means to better align the interests
of brokers and their clients.14 The Tully Report encouraged fee-based
brokerage accounts to proliferate.15 As they did, concerns arose among
brokers and regulators that this form of compensation could be viewed as
“special compensation,” thereby invoking the Advisers Act.16
In 1999, the SEC stepped in and proposed a rule that would exempt
brokers offering fee-based brokerage accounts from being deemed
investment advisers if they satisfied certain conditions. The proposed rule
is very controversial. Independent advisers represented by the Financial
Planning Association (“FPA”) did not like the heightened and more direct
competition from brokers that the proposed rule would allow. Regardless,
the SEC adopted the rule in April of 2005.17 But shortly thereafter, the
FPA sued the SEC to invalidate the rule, and in 2007 the D.C. Circuit
Court did just that, ruling that the SEC had exceeded its authority when it
adopted the rule.18
The D.C. Circuit decision caused the SEC to reconsider the
distinction between brokers and advisers, and so in 2008 it commissioned
a study from the RAND Corporation,19 which found that while investors
were generally happy with the service provided by their broker or adviser,
these investors generally did not understand, or were even confused by,
the differences between the duties owed by brokers and advisers under
securities laws.20
Throughout the following year, in 2009, numerous members of
Congress and senior officials at the SEC and FINRA expressed their
desire and intent to harmonize the regulatory regime for brokers and
advisers. At that time, there was widespread acceptance that the
harmonized standard should be a fiduciary one, under the belief that it
13. DANIEL P. TULLY ET AL., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 1 (1995).
14. Id. at 7, 10.
15. See id.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 275.202 (2016).
18. Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
19. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND CORP., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES
ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pr
ess/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDU2-63KT].
20. Id. at 118.

316

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXII

represents the highest standard and that investors deserve no less. SIFMA
and its members were keenly aware that change was in the air. We wanted
to be part of the conversation and, more importantly, part of a positive
and constructive solution. Particularly in the wake of the financial crisis,
we wanted to make very clear and public that our industry firmly supports
consistent and high standards for interacting with individual clients,
including putting the clients’ best interests first.
Thus, in July of 2009, SIFMA’s Private Client Group convened and,
in an act of leadership, passed a one-page resolution declaring SIFMA’s
support for a fiduciary standard. Here you see the resolution:

Figure 221

In fact, my colleague Kevin Carroll, who is here with us tonight, was a
key draftsperson of that. Kevin has been with me for nearly ten years as
we continue to debate and discuss the fiduciary rule. One year later, on

21.

Hammerman, supra note 3.
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July 15, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act.22 With respect to
fiduciaries, Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to
write rules to implement a new uniform fiduciary standard of conduct
applicable to both brokers and advisers when they provide personalized
investment advice about securities to retail clients.23 Section 913 requires
the uniform fiduciary standard to be no less stringent than the general
fiduciary implied under Section 206 of the Advisers Act.24 The SEC has
no deadline to act, and—as we are all painfully aware, more than six years
later—is not required to take any action at all.
What is SIFMA asking the SEC to do with its Dodd-Frank Section
913 authority? We want the SEC to do precisely what Congress intended
and what Section 913 requires—namely, to articulate the fiduciary duty
implied under Section 206 of the Advisers Act through new rule-making
for brokers under the Exchange Act.25 The SEC should issue the necessary
rules and guidance to enable brokers to apply the standard to their distinct
operational model.26 The plain language of Section 913 together with the
legislative history of Dodd-Frank makes clear that the requirement that
the uniform fiduciary standard be no less stringent than the general
fiduciary duty implied under Section 206 does not require the SEC to
impose Advisers Act rules, guidance, and legal precedence on brokerdealers.27
Do not take our word for it. Congressman Barney Frank, then a
primary author of the Dodd-Frank Act, said so explicitly in a letter to the
SEC Chair, Mary Schapiro, back in 2011.28 So, what is the problem with
extending the Advisers Act guidance and precedent to brokers? The
problem is that such guidance and precedent is based upon the specific
type of services provided and disclosures made by investment advisers
and, thus, it is inherently not directly applicable to broker-dealers.29

22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k) (2012).
24. Id.
25. Memorandum from Ira D. Hammerman to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (July 14, 2011) (on file with SIFMA).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Memorandum from Barney Frank to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairwoman, Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file with author).
29. Memorandum from Ira D. Hammerman, supra note 25.
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This is a critically important point, and it is the same point that Al
Sommer wrote about nearly four decades ago—namely, that establishing
an intermediary, a fiduciary who is required to act in the best interests of
the investor is only the beginning of the analysis, not the end.30 Because
of fundamental differences between brokers’ and advisers’ roles and
business models, attempting to apply the Advisers Act guidance and
precedent to brokers without further clarification by the SEC would create
a high risk of confusion and misapplication, resulting in unnecessary legal
and compliance costs under the new standard.31 At a minimum, SEC rules
and guidance should adequately address a wide range of common
scenarios that brokers face in their daily dealings with clients.32
As we have limited time this evening, allow me to articulate just one
scenario that is very common today and that the SEC would need to
address in clear guidance at the time any uniform fiduciary standard of
care would be formally adopted. This slide is called “The Holistic Review
of a Client Relationship”:
Holistic Review of “Client Relationship”
 Transaction: As a result of several months of market
volatility, Lucy and Jon ask their broker to meet with them
to provide a review of the overall performance of all of the
family’s accounts held at the firm. The broker responds
and provides the Smiths with a review of the fee-based as
well as other accounts including transactional brokerage
and self-directed accounts.
Figure 333

This is very common. Because of several months of market volatility,
Lucy and John Smith ask their broker to meet with them to provide a
review of the overall performance of all five of the family’s accounts held
at the firm. The broker responds and provides the Smiths with a review of
the fee-based discretionary account as well as the transactional brokerage
account, a self-directed account, an IRA, and the 529 college plan
accounts. We need SEC guidance to address the following: if the broker
chooses to provide the Smiths with a holistic review, including the noadvice brokerage and the self-directed accounts, which are not subject to
30.
31.
32.
33.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Ira D. Hammerman, supra note 25.
Id.
Hammerman, supra note 3.
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a fiduciary duty, would the broker potentially create a new fiduciary
obligation for the no-advice accounts by simply doing the right thing and
meeting with the client to discuss all of the accounts?
Even though there are many unanswered questions, SIFMA has laid
the foundation, provided the data, and presented a compelling case for the
SEC to exercise its Section 913 authority over these past seven years.34
Many of the prior comment letters and testimony that we have provided
are on the SIFMA website. We have a statute that authorizes it, an
industry that wants it, and two consecutive SEC chairs who say it is a top
priority. So, why do we not have a uniform fiduciary standard today?
At this moment, I hope we can achieve a moment of clarity,
leadership, and forward thinking. My hope is that the SEC and its leaders
take a cue from the Hamilton cast, performing eight shows a week a few
blocks from here, and do not “throw away their shot.”35 At the risk of
continuing my homage to Hamilton, I am reminded of the famous line
that Hamilton raps when speaking of his friend, rival, nemesis, and
ultimate dueling partner, Aaron Burr: “If you stand for nothing, Burr,
what will you fall for?”36
To our colleagues at the Commission, be they the current occupants
of the tenth floor or the next crew to be nominated by President-Elect
Trump, I sincerely hope you can take a stand and produce some tangible
action on this important investor protection issue. In the meantime, what
else can SIFMA do to further pave the way for an eventual uniform
fiduciary standard from the SEC? I am glad you asked. That is what our
legal challenge to the DoL fiduciary rule is intended to do.
As should be crystal clear now, our pending lawsuit with the DoL is
not a fight against a fiduciary standard; rather, our lawsuit is necessary
because of the botched way the DoL is attempting to achieve its goal. The
DoL has, unfortunately, injected itself into the fiduciary debate covered
by Dodd-Frank and created a rule that applies to just one sliver of

34. Memorandum from Kevin M. Carroll to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Aug. 8, 2016) (on file with SIFMA).
35. See Lin-Manuel Miranda–My Shot Lyrics, MUSIXMATCH (last updated Jan. 22,
2017), https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Lin-Manuel-Miranda/My-Shot [https://perm
a.cc/9ANB-BFBZ].
36. Lin-Manuel Miranda–Aaron Burr, Sir (Off-Broadway) Lyrics, GENIUS,
https://genius.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-aaron-burr-sir-off-broadway-lyrics [https://per
ma.cc/EVE9-BERD].
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investment advice in the only space it has jurisdiction, and that is certain
retirement accounts.37
The DoL rule creates a confusing, bifurcated system for both
financial advisers and their clients, and it stands in direct conflict with the
uniform fiduciary standard contemplated under Dodd-Frank. Moreover,
the DoL rule will be extremely costly and will limit Americans’ access to
retirement-planning advice.38 Some clients, particularly small accounts,
may become too expensive to service and will likely get dropped. Others
will likely be forced into asset-based accounts, where they will pay more
for their advice.
So, DoL got it wrong. But does that mean it violated the law? In this
case, yes. Our lawsuit details several violations and causes of action.39 I
will just quickly highlight two. First, the DoL exceeded its statutory
authority in promulgating this rule. The rule over-broadly redefines who
is a fiduciary, and in doing so it sweeps in every person who sells a
retirement-related product and then prohibits them from receiving
commissions that have been a mainstay of their business model for
decades.40 The DoL rule improperly intrudes upon the jurisdiction of the
SEC, which was directed by Congress to create a uniform fiduciary
standard.41 The SEC’s jurisdiction applies to all investment advice,
whereas DoL is limited to only retirement accounts.42 The SEC has
extensive enforcement and exam authority; the DoL, however, has no
enforcement or exam authority over individual retirement accounts. The
DoL rule is like the tail wagging the dog. The DoL must yield to the SEC
in this already claimed space.
37. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
2509, 2510, 2550).
38. See id.
39. Carol Danko, Lawsuit Filed to Challenge New Department of Labor Rule That
Prevents Financial Professionals from Best Serving Retirement Savers, SIFMA (June 2,
2016), http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/2016/lawsuit-filed-to-challenge-new-departme
nt-of-labor-rule-that-prevents-financial-professionals-from-best-serving-retirement-save
rs/ [https://perma.cc/2KZX-EQZK].
40. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946.
41. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERDEALERS (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/C645-N949].
42. Id.
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, our lawsuit takes issue with
the rule’s Best Interest Contract Exemption (“BICE”), which essentially
forces firms to enter into legally binding contracts with clients in order to
continue doing business on the same terms and to subject themselves to
class-action lawsuits from the plaintiffs’ bar that the DoL has no authority
to impose.43 The DoL thus abused its exemptive authority by forcing
financial professionals to rely on BICE and then conditioning that
exemption on their agreement to requirements and liabilities that the DoL
has no power to impose or enforce. Precisely because the DoL has no
enforcement authority in this area, it has delegated enforcement to private
litigants.
It is truly an unprecedented, exploitative, and improper action by a
federal agency. This is why we have taken legal action to stop the rule.
We are hopeful that the courts will see how the DoL exceeded its authority
and created a rule so complex and so costly that it will make receiving
and giving financial advice more expensive for hardworking Americans
saving for retirement.44
That brings me to my conclusion. I hope each of you will take away
a better understanding of the origins of the call for a uniform best interest
standard, SIFMA’s views on how to implement it, the urgency of our call
to do so now, and finally, why we were compelled to litigate with DoL to
maintain the promise of a uniform fiduciary standard.
The future remains as uncertain as ever. Our DoL case goes to a
hearing next week, and the SEC’s direction under its Dodd-Frank
authority remains murky. Who knows? Maybe seventeen years from now,
the thirty-fourth Annual Sommer Lecture in 2033, when we have all
converted to the fee-based advisory model, will lament the death of and
call for the return of the commission-based brokerage account, while we
all scratch our heads wondering, “How did we get into this mess?”
Stranger things could happen. Stay tuned. This saga has many chapters
still to go.
For my final Hamilton reference, whenever the fiduciary debate gets
sorted out, all I know is “I wanna [sic] be in the room where it happens.”45
Thank you for listening and, again, thank you for the honor.

43. Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
44. Danko, supra note 39.
45. The Room Where It Happens Lyrics–Lin-Manuel Miranda, GENIUS, https://geni
us.com/Lin-manuel-miranda-the-room-where-it-happens-lyrics [https://perma.cc/62AUYBEZ].
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DEAN DILLER: Ira has agreed to take some questions and
comments.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. You are giving your speech at
an interesting time. Should the SEC move ahead with a uniform standard
now requiring broker-dealers to honor the best interests of their clients?
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: One of the themes in my talk was that we
do think the SEC is the proper agency to move forward. To answer your
question about doing it now, there are many complexities to them acting
now.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: If I could push that, I do not expect them to
act this week, but suppose that the new administration proposed that
Dodd-Frank be repealed in whole; would you favor the SEC retaining its
authority to adopt a uniform fiduciary standard?
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: I guess we will all have to wait and see
about the first part of your question. I personally would be surprised if
now President-Elect Trump, who is no longer campaigning for office, will
still be pushing for the repeal of Dodd-Frank, which I think was the
premise of your question. I do not think we will end up going down that
path. But whether we do or not, the answer to the second part of your
question is that the SEC is the expert agency; it is the right agency to deal
with this issue. Whether or not this issue remains in Dodd-Frank, I believe
we would still be in favor of the SEC being the proper agency to wrestle
with this very complicated issue and topic.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What is your sense of why the SEC has not
acted? There were all kinds of opportunities obviously before the DoL
started to move. When it became apparent the DoL was starting to move,
there was even a greater incentive, and I think an encouragement, on
many people’s parts to get the SEC to move, and yet it seems not to have
gotten off the ground. Notwithstanding all the other things it had to do,
why let the issue get processed by DoL?
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: Great question. We have been asking that
same question for six-plus years now. We have heard everything,
including “it’s complicated”—but life is complicated. We still have
enough support and belief that the SEC could figure it out. So, yes, it is
complicated; yes, Congress may not have given them the most artful
language in Section 913 to resolve the best interests of the client with
preserving a commission-based model.46 We totally respect and
understand that it is a complicated issue, but we are also a bit disappointed
46.

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012).
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that now, six and seven years on, they really have not moved the ball
forward, at least publicly. We would hear lots of discussion internally that
investment management and trading and markets were working together
on it, but we certainly have not seen anything. Hopefully, new day, new
administration, that can change.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This may be the other side of the same
question, which is: do you have any sense as to what prompted the DoL
to step into this, the SEC not having acted?
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: My only observation—and you and your
colleagues have seen a lot over the years as well—is that this was
politically motivated rule-making from day one. In my career, I do not
remember a sitting president having a press conference over a proposal
that some agency was thinking about, and this was just very politically
charged from the get go. It is like it was preordained in terms of what the
DoL would do here. It has been disappointing that the SEC has not taken
the lead. I am a “glass half-full” kind of guy, so I am hoping now—we
are going to have a change in administrations, there will be new folks
leading the SEC, and who knows what happens on the DoL side of the
equation? There will be a new Secretary of Labor. President-Elect Trump
will have many things to work through, and hopefully the DoL piece is
on that list as well.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I was curious what you thought was a
bigger inspiration for the SEC to act now: that potentially other agencies
like the DoL would be intruding on its space to govern, or if it was because
individual investors were being harmed by not having this uniform
fiduciary standard?
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: As I tried to address in the talk, the
securities business is an intensely and heavily regulated industry—at the
federal level, state level, and also by the self-regulatory organizations. We
can certainly debate that if you are a broker-dealer or an investment
adviser, at the federal level you are heavily regulated.
The challenge has been—as in many things in life—business goes
faster than regulation. So, the business over the last twenty and thirty
years has converged—the broker-dealer model, the investment adviser
model; everyone is in the advice business now. That is what customers
need, want, and are willing to pay for. But we want to preserve the
customer experience and the customers’ choices over how they pay for
their services. Some people want commissions—they do not trade all that
much. Others need a lot more hand holding and constant monitoring of
their accounts, and maybe asset-based pricing works for them. But,
regardless of which side of the fence you are on, brokers or advisers, what
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we think at SIFMA is, the time has come to now have that same uniform
fiduciary standard of care so when the customer is receiving advice they
should know that standard is the same.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Our system of securities laws does have
different tiers of protection for investors of different levels of
sophistication. So why is it that there could not be this unified standard
and then the additional standard set forth by the DoL when it comes to
retirement accounts where, in many cases, we are dealing with the least
sophisticated investors?
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: The challenge is if you are in the financial
services industry today, you have many different regulators, and if you
are going to have the DoL with its standard of care and the SEC with
multiple standards of care—because you have the fiduciary standard if
you are under the Advisers Act, you have the suitability standard if you
are a broker-dealer—firms, particularly the larger firms with 10,000,
15,000 financial advisers and millions of households as customers, need
to come up with a system that is going to work so that they can educate
their employees. To have one agency that is not as much of an expert in
the securities market and securities laws dictate how an IRA account
should be held, as I say in the talk, is the tail wagging the dog.
At many of the brokerage firms, the largest percentage of retail
customer securities are in the IRA account—that is kind of the bread-andbutter business of the financial services industry—and many of those
customers are buy-and-hold investors who are comfortable paying a
commission when they buy a security and know that they are going to
hold Apple, just to use an example, for ten years and twenty years. So,
they pay once, and it is in their account. That is a choice that they like,
and we want to preserve their ability.
For the DoL—again, not an expert in what is going on in terms of
the securities markets—to come up and say, “You know what? We do not
like commissions, and we are going to make it very, very difficult to do a
commission business” kind of forces people into asset-based pricing, and
that is taking away choice from the customers.
To really simplify it, the DoL is saying, “Index funds–good; active
funds–bad,” and they are saying, “Fee-based accounts–good;
commissions–bad.” What we are saying on behalf of our members is,
“Customers want choice.” The industry has longstanding relationships
with its customers, and it knows what its customers want; it is in a service
business, and it wants to preserve choice for its customers.

2017]

SEC—DON'T THROW AWAY YOUR SHOT!

325

DEAN DILLER: Well, thank you for making a complex subject so
clear that even I can understand it, and thank you for your thoughtful
remarks.
IRA D. HAMMERMAN: Thank you.

